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PREFACE 
he inspiration for this study came from the observation 
that the United States and Europe initially seemed to face 
a very similar financial crisis. Housing prices and credit 
had increased by a similar percentage on both sides of the 
Atlantic during the boom years which ended in 2007-08. The 
economic contraction and the tensions in financial markets also 
seemed very similar. However, after about 2009-10, the US 
started to recover, albeit slowly, with financial markets 
stabilising early on. In the euro area, by contrast, the crisis 
became a regional one, with pockets of concentrated tensions 
and large risk premia on government debt even in countries 
whose budgets had been in surplus before the crisis (Ireland and 
Spain). 
This eruption of regional financial crisis seemed odd given 
that the preceding boom had also been regionally concentrated 
in the US. The extraordinary housing price booms in parts of the 
‘sun belt’ of the US seemed to have been no different from what 
had happened in Ireland and Spain.  
This difference suggested that it might be useful to study 
in detail how regional financial boom-bust cycles played out in 
the US. The results of this investigation proved to be both 
interesting and full of policy implications. 
We gratefully acknowledge valuable comments received 
by participants at the “International Finance and Banking (FIBA) 
Conference, 26-27 March 2015 in Bucharest, where the 
background study to this book was presented as a keynote 
lecture. 
Other useful comments were received at conferences in 
Tübingen, 7-8 May 2015 and Rethymno, Crete, 28-30 May 2015.  
Daniel Gros, Brussels 
Ansgar Belke, Essen 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND 
MOTIVATION 
he euro area started as a pure ‘monetary union’. It is now 
in the process of also becoming a ‘banking union’ (BU). EU 
leaders have argued that even this step is not enough. In 
September 2012, close to the peak of the euro crisis, a joint report 
by the four Presidents of the European Union (the Presidents of 
the European Commission, the European Council, the 
Eurogroup and the European Central Bank), entitled “Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union”, argued that much more was 
needed (Belke, 2013; Begg, 2014). The four Presidents argued in 
essence that the establishment of a banking union should also be 
seen as a first step towards further integration. According to their 
report, a fiscal union would be the next logical step. Moreover, a 
fiscal union was held to imply the need for a political union. 
There is surprisingly little analytical support, however, for 
the claim that a banking union needs to lead to a fiscal union 
(Belke, 2013 and 2013a). The key argument most often heard is 
simply the observation that the euro area has only a very limited 
central budget (at least compared with other monetary unions), 
and that therefore there are almost no fiscal transfers to smooth 
asymmetric shocks. By contrast, the US, which is similar in size 
to the euro area, does have a substantial federal fiscal budget. 
The US experience is thus usually taken as a model of what is 
needed for a sustainable monetary union. 
This study contributes to this debate by illustrating how 
the ‘banking union’ of the US provides very tangible insurance 
T
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against local financial shocks, without major involvement of the 
‘fiscal union’, which undoubtedly also exists in the US.1  
The transatlantic financial crisis which started in 2007-08 
and led to the Great Recession provides a key episode in 
assessing the importance of mechanisms to absorb regional 
shocks. The financial shocks quickly became regional in the euro 
area after 2009-10 when the financial systems of some countries 
almost collapsed and their sovereigns lost market access, e.g. 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece. It is often overlooked that the 
origins of the crisis in the US were also rather concentrated at the 
regional level. The housing boom was very concentrated in the 
US. The increase in housing prices varied enormously from state 
to state and only a few states (Arizona, Nevada, Florida and 
California) tended to account for most of the sub-prime lending, 
overbuilding and thus the subsequent economic distress and 
losses from delinquent mortgages.2 
However, the US experienced ‘only’ a system-wide crisis 
in 2007-09. There was no specific crisis involving only those 
states where the real estate excesses had been most marked 
(Nevada, Florida and California). The main thrust of this study 
is that the US was better equipped to deal with these regional 
shocks because it is a fully fledged banking union. 
The euro area officially has a banking union, but most 
observers would agree that it is incomplete if one starts with the 
three ‘canonical’ elements of a banking union (IMF, 2013a and b): 
1) Common supervision. This has been achieved since the ECB, 
under the heading of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), has become the ultimate supervisor for all banks in 
the euro area, and the direct supervisor of about 130 of the 
                                                   
1 For the debate on a “currency union with and without a banking union”, 
see also the model-based contribution by Bignon, Breton and Breu (2013). 
2 This is not to deny that there was also a nation-wide element in the 
housing boom. Housing prices increased almost everywhere (and then fell 
almost everywhere). But the excesses (the “froth”, in the words of Alan 
Greenspan) were concentrated in a few states. 
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largest banks accounting for about two-thirds of banking 
assets. 
2) A common mechanism to resolve banks. This has also been 
achieved with the creation of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), which will be able to rely on a common 
fund, i.e. the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), after a 
transition period. The SRM will cover all banks in the euro 
area (and in those other EU countries wishing to join the 
SSM). 
3) Common deposit insurance. No agreement has been reached 
on this point. It remains to be seen how important this 
lacuna will become.  
By contrast, the US has had all three elements in place at 
least since 1933.3 The US thus qualifies as having had a banking 
union for over 80 years. (But one should also not forget that the 
US monetary union survived almost a century and a half without 
being a banking union.) 
The central theme of this study is that the consequences of 
the US banking union could be seen during the financial crisis. A 
simple comparison of the fate of two different members of a large 
monetary union, after they were hit by a financial crisis, offers a 
powerful illustration of the importance of an integrated banking 
system. Ireland and Nevada, in fact, provide an almost ideal test 
case. These two entities share several important characteristics. 
For example, they both have similar populations as well as 
comparable GDP/GSP (gross domestic product/gross state 
product), and they both experienced an exceptionally strong 
housing boom. But when the boom turned to bust, the US states 
did not experience any local financial crisis (nor did any state 
government have to be bailed out). 
                                                   
3 In that year, a common mechanism and fund for both deposit insurance 
and resolution was created in the form of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The FDIC was created after most of the 50 state-based deposit 
insurance schemes went bankrupt as a country-wide banking crisis led to 
the failure of hundreds of banks. 
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We find that the key difference between Nevada and 
Ireland is that banking problems in the US are handled at the 
federal level (the US is a banking union), whereas in the euro 
area, responsibility for banking losses remains national. 
Moreover, we also find that large banks with a wide footprint 
can also help to absorb regional shocks (at the cost of 
transmitting them to the entire system). 
This book is organised as follows. The next chapter 
presents some case studies of the stabilisation properties of a 
banking union. Chapter 3 then analyses the role of ‘foreign-
owned banks’ as a sort of ‘private banking union’. Chapter 4 
looks at the institutions that paid for the shock absorption 
provided by the official US federal banking-related institutions: 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), commonly known as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Chapter 5 speculates on the extent 
to which European banking union as currently planned could 
provide comparably strong protection against regional shocks. 
Chapter 6 presents some considerations on the degree of 
financial integration in the euro area and discusses how the 
insurance premia within the SRM should be determined. 
Chapter 7 contains some general considerations with respect to 
a fiscal union and financial shock absorbers and the final chapter 
offers conclusions. 
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2. THE MACROECONOMIC 
STABILISATION PROPERTIES OF A 
BANKING UNION: SOME CASE 
STUDIES 
n this chapter we analyse the implications of a banking union 
for macroeconomic stability by making comparisons between 
countries/states that have experienced similar local boom-
bust cycles in real estate, but are part of different federal systems 
in terms of financial markets.4 
The comparison pairs are Ireland-Nevada, Spain-Florida 
and Latvia-Nevada. The first two pairs are part of a larger 
currency area. The Latvia-Nevada comparison is interesting 
because Latvia was not in the euro area during its boom-bust 
cycle, but its banking system was dominated by banks from 
Nordic countries. In this sense, Latvia benefited from some 
protection provided within the ‘Nordic Banking Union’.5 
The pairing Ireland-Nevada is the one that comes closest 
to a natural experiment as these two entities are of a very similar 
size and had a very similar boom and bust in terms of real estate. 
The key difference, of course, is that the banks operating in 
                                                   
4 The starting point for this section is Gros (2012b). 
5 At the time (2008), Latvia operated under a currency board arrangement 
and was hoping to adopt the euro soon. The tensions over the exchange 
rate of the Lat (although they were resisted in the end) seemed to create an 
illustration of the benefits of membership. And at that time, there were still 
relatively few tensions within the euro area, which thus appeared as a 
haven of stability. The Greek crisis erupted much later. The pay-off from a 
quick adjustment was thus stronger for Latvia than it was for Greece. 
I
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Nevada are part of the fully integrated and wider US banking 
system to such a degree that one cannot really speak of a 
‘banking system of Nevada’. The analysis will show that this was 
decisive for the limited impact of the great recession on the local 
economy and local public finances in Nevada (and other US 
states with similar local real estate booms). 
Florida can similarly be compared to Spain. Both of these 
entities represent larger, more diversified economies than either 
Nevada or Ireland. Somewhat surprisingly (it was stated above 
that real estate booms tend to bear a regional character), real 
estate investments seem to have played a larger role in Spain, 
although the country is somewhat larger than Florida. 
Another useful comparison is that between Nevada and 
Latvia or the other Baltic countries. None of the latter was part of 
the euro area when the crisis struck them in 2008-09, although 
they all had fixed their exchange rate to the euro and were thus 
informally in an (asymmetric) currency union with the euro area. 
Nevertheless, they weathered the crisis more quickly than 
Ireland, or other peripheral euro-area countries, because they 
benefited from the fact that their banks were largely owned by 
big Nordic banks which were able to absorb the losses that arose 
when the housing boom collapsed and the Baltic economies 
experienced a very sharp recession. It is interesting that the only 
Baltic country that needed a bailout was Latvia, which was also 
the only country that still had a significant local bank. 
Before going more deeply into these comparisons, it is 
useful to consider the extent to which the boom-bust cycle is 
different between the US and the euro area at the aggregate level. 
2.1 Regional concentration of real estate cycles within 
a monetary union 
The aggregate data on housing prices and construction activity 
(as a percentage of GDP) reveals a considerable similarity. The 
boom was actually somewhat more pronounced in the US than 
in the euro area, at least if one looks at aggregate numbers. 
Housing prices increased by more in the US and then fell by 
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more, but also recovered earlier, thus ending up at a similar level 
relative to that of the euro area (EA), if one looks at the period 
since the start of monetary union (Figure 1, right-hand side). 
Figure 1. Development of the real estate sector – the US vs 
 the euro area (1995-2012) 
Construction (% of GDP) 
 
Housing prices (index 2000=100) 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
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An even more important indicator of the potential cost of a 
real estate cycle is the amount of construction activity 
undertaken (Figure 1, left-hand side). A large stock of unsellable 
houses often constitutes the main reason for losses on mortgages. 
Here again, one finds that the cycle was somewhat more 
pronounced in the US than in the euro area since construction 
spending fell by about 1.3 percentage points of GDP in the US, 
but only about 1.1 percentage points of GDP (on aggregate) in 
the euro area. 
How could one then explain that the US recovered earlier 
from the bust of the housing bubble and that there were very 
serious difficulties at the national level in Europe, even in 
countries like Ireland or Spain, where public finance had been 
under control? 
It is tempting to argue that the lack of regional problems in 
the US was due to a more uniform manifestation of the boom in 
the US than in the euro area. Within the euro area the average 
number hides fundamental differences between the peripheral 
countries Spain and Ireland, where both housing prices and 
construction activity boomed until 2007, and core countries like 
Germany where both housing prices and construction activity 
were relatively weak (again until 2007-08). 
However, the boom-bust was also very concentrated in the 
US. Figure 2 below shows the distribution of the losses sustained 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)  during the 
last crisis in each state. It is apparent that the banking problems 
were highly concentrated in a few states (small dots indicate 
losses above 3% of GSP, diagonal stripes 1.5-2% of GSP and solid 
filler, below 0.5% of GSP). 
This combination of a similar boom/bust pattern in the 
aggregate variables and a similar degree of concentration at the 
regional level already suggests that the structure of the financial 
system and its backup mechanism must have played a key role 
in containing regional problems in the US. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of losses sustained by the FDIC from the 
2007-08 sub-prime crisis (% of GSP) 
 
Source: Configured by the authors based on data from FDIC documents. 
 
2.2 Ireland vs Nevada 
Ireland and Nevada share several important characteristics, as 
reflected in Table 1 below. Their populations are not overly 
different (2.7 million vs. 4.5 million) and rather similar levels of 
GDP/gross state product (GSP) ($120 billion vs. $200 billion), at 
least as a share of the eurozone and US GDP, respectively. Both 
experienced a strong recession and a very similar level of 
unemployment. However, the fall in GDP and GSP, respectively, 
was much larger in Ireland than in Nevada. As will be argued 
below, this was due to the fact that the losses arising from the 
real estate bust in Nevada were to a large extent absorbed by the 
US federal financial system.  
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Table 1. Key statistics on Nevada vs Ireland 
  Nevada Ireland 
Population (million, 2011) 2.7 4.5 
GSP/GDP ($/€ billion, 2011) 120 200 
Change in GSP/GDP (2007-10) -5.3% -17.6% 
Average net migration rate since ‘bust’ (2008) 
as percentage of total population 0.32% 0.09% 
Unemployment rate (2011) 13.5% 14.4% 
Data sources: Eurostat, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and US Census Bureau. 
The most important similarity is, however, that they both 
experienced an exceptionally strong housing boom – and bust. 
The similarity of the boom-bust cycle is shown in Figures 3a to 
3d: 
 3a shows (nominal) GSP and GDP increased by a very 
similar proportion during the boom and then fell. 
 3b shows the evolution of housing prices, which increased 
until 2007-08 and then fell. This was the first fall in housing 
prices during peace time for the US. 
 3c shows construction activity as a percentage of GDP (for 
Ireland) and of GSP (gross state product for Nevada). It is 
again apparent that the two series follow the same pattern, 
but construction activity seems to have been much more 
important to the economy of Ireland than to that of 
Nevada. However, this difference might be due to a 
difference in definition of the aggregate ‘construction’ in 
the national accounts. 
 3d shows the consequences for the real economy in terms 
of the unemployment rate, which also follows a similar 
pattern. 
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Figure 3. The boom-bust cycle: Nevada vs Ireland 
Figure 3a. Nominal GSP and GDP (index 2000= 100) 
 
Figure 3b. Housing prices (2000=100) 
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Figure 3c. Construction activity (% of GDP/GSP) 
 
Figure 3d. Unemployment (% of the labour force) 
 
Data sources: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
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However, there is one fundamental difference between the 
two: when the boom turned to bust, Nevada did not experience 
any local financial crisis and the state government did not have 
to be bailed out. By contrast, the government of Ireland was for 
some time unable to issue any new debt on the market and had 
to be supported by a very large loan financed jointly by the IMF 
and the European rescue fund, i.e. the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and its precursor, the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF).  
The key difference between Nevada and Ireland is that 
banking problems in the US are taken care of at the federal level 
(as the US is a banking union), whereas in the euro area, 
responsibility for banking losses was national, and will remain 
partially national until the SRF is fully operational. 
Local banks in Nevada experienced huge losses (just like 
in Ireland) and many of them became insolvent, but this did not 
lead to any disruption of the local banking system as these banks 
were seized by the FDIC, which covered the losses and 
transferred the operations to other, stronger banks. In 2008-09, 
the FDIC thus closed 11 banks headquartered in the state, with 
assets of over $40 billion, or about 30% of GSP. The losses for the 
FDIC in these rescue/restructuring operations amounted to 
about $4 billion.6  
                                                   
6 The initial loss estimates of the FDIC were later revised downwards to 
$2.4 billion, as some of the assets which the FDIC had to evaluate at crisis 
prices later recovered partially in value. However, the initial estimate 
constitutes the more important figure because it shows the amount of risk 
the FDIC was prepared to assume at the height of the crisis. During a 
financial crisis the perception of risk by the market and the ability to bear 
risk are more important than the exact amount of the losses that materialise 
once the crisis is over. The loss estimates of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were not revised as they represent just the sum of mortgages that did not 
perform. At first sight it appears that the loss rate for the FDIC was about 
10%, not much higher than the 8% of bail-inable debt instruments that EU 
banks are supposed to hold under the regulations. This would seem to 
suggest that the likelihood that the SRM could face large losses should be 
minor. However, Washington Mutual (WaMu), which had its headquarters 
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Other losses were borne at the federal level when residents 
of Nevada defaulted in large numbers on their home mortgages. 
The two federal institutions that refinance mortgages have lost 
between them about $8 billion in the state since 2008.7 
The federal institutions of the US banking union thus 
provided Nevada with a ‘shock absorber’ of about 8-9% of GSP, 
not in the form of loans, but in the form of an (ex-post) transfer 
because losses of this magnitude were borne at the federal level. 
(Against this transfer one would of course have to set the 
insurance premia paid by banks in Nevada prior to the bust. But 
they are likely to have been of a lesser magnitude.) 
Of course, a lot of the banking business in Nevada was 
(and still is) conducted by ‘foreign’ banks, i.e. out-of-state banks, 
which just took the losses from their Nevada operations on their 
books and could set them against profits made elsewhere.8 This 
is another way in which an integrated banking market can 
provide insurance against local financial shocks. One might call 
                                                   
in the state, represents a large part of the balance sheet of banks that were 
subject to intervention. However, given that there was no loss for the FDIC 
in this operation (WaMu was sold for $1), the loss rate on the other banks 
was much higher, about 30%.  
7 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken the unusual step of indicating 
their credit losses for those states hardest hit by the crisis (including 
Nevada, Florida and California, for example).   
8 The experience of WaMu constitutes a somewhat special case. The biggest 
bank to have failed in US history, a mortgage specialist, WaMu had its 
headquarters in Nevada (although the name suggests otherwise) and 
conducted some minor operations there. However, its failure did not lead 
to any local losses as WaMu was seized by the FDIC and its banking 
operations were sold for a very low sum to another large US bank (JP 
Morgan Chase) – but without any loss for the FDIC. Such an ‘overnight’ 
operation would have been impossible in Europe where no euro area-wide 
institution would have carried through a cross-border takeover of this size. 
Moreover, WaMu received about $80 billion in low-cost financing from the 
US Federal Home Loan Bank. Irish banks received massive amounts of 
low-cost emergency liquidity assistance from the ECB, but the Central Bank 
of Ireland had to guarantee these loans, which was not the case for the state 
of Nevada or for any bank in Nevada. 
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this a ‘private’ banking union (or a truly integrated banking 
market). It is impossible to estimate the size of this additional 
shock absorber, but the losses absorbed by out-of-state banks 
might very well have been at least as large again as the losses 
borne by the federal institutions. The total write-down of the 
large US banks, which operate across the entire US, was about 
$440 billion, twice as much as the $220 billion in losses of the 
three official institutions (FDIC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
If these losses were distributed in a similar way to the losses of 
the official institutions mentioned so far, one could conclude that 
the shock absorption capacity of the large union-wide banks is 
likely to have been worth about 17% of GDP. 
Nevada was also one of the states where ‘non-conforming’ 
or ‘sub-prime’ mortgages became particularly widespread. Non-
conforming loans are not eligible for insurance and securitisation 
by the GSEs, but they were widely packaged into residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which then were sold to 
investors worldwide. Some of these sub-prime securities 
remained on the balance sheets of the large US banks mentioned 
above. But a large part was bought by other US and foreign 
investors. These investors thus absorbed another part of the 
losses generated locally. The scale of this additional risk-sharing 
is very difficult to estimate precisely. But given that sub-prime 
issuance was also particularly widespread in Nevada it is likely 
that this risk-sharing was also substantial. 
All in all, one can thus conclude that the overall loss 
absorption provided by the public institutions (FDIC and the two 
GSEs) and the private sector (large banks, sub-prime 
securitisation) must have been substantially larger than the 
25.5% of GDP coming through the FDIC and the GSEs plus the 
banks (8.5% + 17% = 25.5%). 
In Europe, there was no official risk-sharing in the sense 
that the Irish government had to take responsibility for saving 
the banks in Ireland. The ESM did provide financing for the Irish 
government when it lost market access. But the ESM could 
provide only loans, which have to be repaid with interest. 
Moreover, as an implicit condition of this support the Irish 
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government was asked not to bail in investors holding the bonds 
of Irish banks.9 
One consequence of this lack of risk-sharing was that 
public debt soared in Ireland. As shown in the Figure 4 below, 
just prior to the start of the crisis, Ireland had a very low 
debt/GDP ratio of around 25% of GDP, which was actually very 
similar to that of Nevada. The debt ratio of Nevada did not 
increase much, even though the housing cycle was very similar, 
as illustrated above. Today the debt ratio of Ireland is above 
120% of GDP, six times that of Nevada. 
Figure 4. Irish government debt vs the state of Nevada and local debt 
(% of GDP/GSP) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
                                                   
9 There has been considerable discussion about the importance of this bail-
out of the bondholders, which often seems to be over-estimated. The legal 
framework was not totally clear on how to default on bond holders without 
going into a full bankruptcy. The amount at stake has been estimated at 
around €3-4 billion by the ECB. This is not an insignificant sum relative to 
the Irish economy (about 2% of GDP), but by itself would not have changed 
the outlook for Irish debt sustainability in a decisive way. Moreover, since 
part of the debt was held by Irish entities, including Irish pension funds, 
the burden of a ‘private sector involvement’ would have fallen in any 
event, at least partially, on Irish citizens. See McArdle (2012) for a 
comprehensive assessment of the matter.  
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In Europe, this ‘private’ banking union channel of risk 
mutualisation operates only in some cases. It is of paramount 
importance only for the smaller Baltic EU countries, whose banks 
are to a large extent in foreign hands. Estonia and Lithuania (and 
to a lesser extent Latvia) thus benefited before their entry into the 
euro area from similar protection against losses provided by the 
Scandinavian headquarters of their local banks. By contrast, 
most of the real estate lending in Ireland (and Spain) had mostly 
been extended by local banks so that most of the losses remained 
local (without any federal institution to provide insurance).10 
The comparison between Nevada and Ireland thus clearly 
illustrates the shock-absorbing capacity of an integrated banking 
system and a banking union. For Nevada, the banking union 
resulted in a transfer worth over 25%, possibly up to 30%, of its 
income. Nevada is admittedly an extreme example of the 
housing boom and bust. Nevertheless, it illustrates the general 
point that a banking union can provide more shock-absorbing 
capacity than could ever be provided by any common budget 
(‘fiscal capacity’) that is currently being contemplated for the 
euro area. 
2.3 Florida: Another example of the US banking union 
in action  
Florida and Spain constitute another pair that can be used to 
illustrate the difference in the impact of a local real estate boom-
bust cycle when there is a fully fledged banking union. Both 
Florida and Spain are much larger and more diversified 
economies than that of Ireland (or Nevada) and their housing 
cycles were less extreme. Table 2 below provides some of the 
basic data, showing that Florida is about half the size of Spain, 
both in terms of population and GSP, and that initially the impact 
                                                   
10 It appears, however, that the larger UK banks, like RBS, also had 
substantial operations in Ireland, where they had to write off about £8 
billion. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish what proportion of the 
write-off resulted in actual losses and what part of any losses was incurred 
in the Republic of Ireland and what part in Northern Ireland.   
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on its GSP was very similar. However, the local labour markets 
reacted in a very different way.  
Table 2. Key statistics on Spain vs Florida 
 Spain Florida  
Population (millions, 2011)  46.1  19.1  
Nominal GDP/GSP (€ billions, 2011)  1,063  542 ($770 
billion) 
Change in nominal GDP/GSP (2007-11)  1.0%  -0.9%  
Unemployment rate (2011)  21.7%  10.5%  
Change in unemployment rate (2007-11)  13.4pp  6.5pp  
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
 
Also, Figures 5a-d below provide an indication of the 
similarity in the cycle. Nominal GDP increased a bit more in 
Spain, but the downturn also lasted longer so that the increase in 
GDP was almost exactly the same over the entire cycle. A similar 
pattern can be seen for housing prices, which fell earlier in 
Florida, but then also started recently to recover; whereas 
Spanish housing prices continue to fall. Investment in 
construction follows exactly the same pattern, but has always 
been higher in Spain. It is in unemployment that one sees a 
decisive divergence with the bust. Unemployment rose initially 
in a similar way, but has continued to increase in Spain and has 
already declined substantially in Florida. 
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Figure 5. The boom-bust cycle in Florida vs Spain 
Figure 5a. Nominal GSP/GDP (index 2000=100) 
 
Figure 5b. Housing prices (index 2000=100) 
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Figure 5c. Construction activity (% GDP/GSP) 
 
Figure 5d. Unemployment (% of labour force) 
 
Data sources: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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The key difference one has to explain is again that the state 
government of Florida was barely affected by the crisis whereas 
the government of Spain had to pay a substantial risk premium 
for issuing new debt. Moreover, when the full scale of the 
banking problems became apparent Spain received a loan of €60 
billion (about 6% of its GDP) to help finance the recapitalisation 
of its problem banks (mainly the cajas, which had engaged in 
most of the real estate lending which caused most of the losses).  
By contrast, in Florida one can see again the US banking 
union in action. During the period 2008-12 the FDIC closed over 
70 banks headquartered in Florida, with total losses for the FDIC 
of roughly $14 billion, or 2% of Florida GSP.  
Moreover, mortgages originating in Florida and covered 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced high default rates, 
leading to losses of the two GSEs of $19 billion since 2008. Federal 
loss-sharing on mortgages originating in Florida, but insured by 
the GSEs, thus amounted to another 2.3% of Florida’s GSP. Total 
direct loss absorption through the official banking union 
amounted to about $33 billion, or 4.3% of GDP.  
As argued above, one has to consider that in Florida (as in 
Nevada) the large US banks operating nationwide have a very 
large share. Under the maintained assumption that the losses at 
the large US banks operating nationwide were about twice those 
of the FDIC and GSEs combined, it follows that private sector 
losses borne ‘out of state’ might be twice as large as those 
assumed by the FDIC and GSEs, or probably another 8-9% of 
GDP.  
The total loss absorption (ex post) of the private and public 
pillars of the US banking union for Florida was thus probably 
more than 12% of GSP. By comparison, Spain did receive a loan 
from the ESM, worth about 6% of its GDP, to help finance the 
recapitalisation of Spanish mortgage banks (cajas). But this was a 
loan and has to be repaid with interest. 
As for Nevada, another form of loss absorption came 
through private sector securitisation. In the US, the most risky 
part (sub-prime) of the mortgages (which accounted for about 
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20% of all originations in Florida) were securitised and sold to 
capital market investors not only in the US, but also 
internationally (including many Europeans). Large US banks 
retained only part of the remaining risk. A further part of the 
local risk from sub-prime mortgages was thus borne by ‘out-of-
state’ investors, protecting the economy of Florida, which could 
rebound earlier as its debt burden was much lighter. 
2.4 Nevada vs Latvia 
The Baltic states experienced strong growth rates in GDP and 
housing prices, and double-digit current account deficits until 
about 2007. This boom turned into a bust very quickly when 
global financial conditions worsened in 2007-08. The adjustment 
was then very sharp, with GDP falling by double-digit 
percentages as investment in construction virtually came to a 
standstill and credit dried up (Figures 6a-d).  
Figure 6. The boom-bust cycle in Nevada vs Latvia  
Figure 6a. Nominal GDP (index 2000=100) 
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Figure 6b. Housing prices (index Nevada 2000=100 and Latvia 
2006=100) 
 
Figure 6c. Construction activity (% GSP/GDP) 
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Figure 6d. Unemployment (% of work force) 
 
Data sources: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
None of the Baltic countries was in the euro area when this 
occurred. This meant that their local banks could not access the 
various facilities of the ECB and the national central banks had 
to be rather restrictive, given that they wanted to defend their 
exchange rate against the euro. Only one of the Baltic countries, 
Latvia, needed international financial assistance, mainly to deal 
with the aftermath of the problems at its only large domestic 
bank.  
Although Latvia was not then (2007-08) in the euro area, it 
still makes sense to compare it to Nevada because the adjustment 
patterns were similar due to the strong presence of foreign 
banks. Housing prices (available only since 2006) fell strongly 
when the crisis hit in 2008, but recovered already a few years 
later (as in Nevada) (Figure 6b). Unemployment first rose even 
more than in Nevada, but also started to improve after a few 
years, mimicking the pattern of Nevada (Figure 6d). In terms of 
construction activity, the upturn had been shorter and sharper in 
Latvia, but here also the recovery set in quickly (in contrast to 
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Nevada where the longer period of elevated construction activity 
probably led to a more significant housing overhang) (Figure 6c). 
The one reason why this relatively early recovery was 
possible in Latvia (despite the fall in GDP of over 25%) was that 
foreign banks owned over 60% of the country’s banking system. 
These banks thus absorbed most of the losses that arose when the 
Latvian housing market crashed in 2007-08. 
Naturally, it is very difficult to pinpoint the origin of losses 
occurring within large internationally active banks. The available 
anecdotal evidence suggests that Swedish banks alone made 
loan losses in the Baltics of about $12-20 billion between 2009 and 
2012, which would be several times greater than the capital 
invested in the local subsidiaries and would amount to between 
15% and over 20% of the combined GDP of the three Baltic 
states.11 
Given that other Scandinavian banks also had a significant 
part of the market in the Baltic states (about one-third, on 
average) it is thus likely that the total loss absorption by foreign 
banks in the Baltic states was closer to 30% of their GDP.  
The Baltic states thus benefited enormously from the fact 
that their banking systems consisted essentially of subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. As loan losses were in many cases greater than the 
capital invested in these subsidiaries, the foreign (mostly 
Swedish) banks could have walked away from their daughter 
companies, which would have forced the Baltic governments to 
sustain them during the crisis. However, the Swedish (and other 
Nordic) banks chose to put additional capital into their Baltic 
subsidiaries because they were counting on the region’s long-
term growth potential.12 
                                                   
11 See “Swedish banks can handle Baltic losses of 20 billion dollars” 
(www.baltic-course.com/eng/finances/?doc=14707; see also “Riksbank 
sees 2010 Baltic bank losses at USD 3.7 bln”, (www.baltic-course.com/eng/ 
finances/?doc=23185). 
12 See Ingves (2010) and “SEB banka has not yet recovered what it lost 
during financial crisis” (www.baltic-course.com/eng/finances/?doc= 
88286).  
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The broad conclusion that emerges is that one of the 
reasons why Latvia (as the other Baltic states) weathered the 
crisis more quickly than Ireland or Spain is that it benefited from 
the fact that its banks were to a large extent owned by larger 
Nordic banks, which were able to absorb the losses that arose 
when the housing boom collapsed and the Baltic economies 
experienced a very sharp recession. It is interesting to note that 
the only Baltic country that needed a bail-out was Latvia, which 
was also the only country that still had a significant local bank. 
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3. FOREIGN-OWNED BANKS:  
A BANKING UNION SUBSTITUTE? 
THE EU EXPERIENCE  
he case studies presented in the previous chapter suggest 
that the large banks that operate throughout the entire US 
provided a very important channel through which local 
shocks could be better absorbed. The estimates provided above 
suggest that the shock-absorbing contribution from 
internationally active banks could have been twice as significant 
as the one provided by the official ‘banking union’ institutions 
(the FDIC and the GSEs). But cross-border banking has remained 
limited in Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, however, 
transnationally operating banks have played a more important 
role outside the euro area than within the euro area.  
For example, Spain did not have protection from a banking 
union as there was little activity of foreign-owned banks in 
Spain. Moreover, most of the real estate-related lending that later 
caused most of the losses was done by the local cajas that 
financed their loan books not with local savings, but by attracting 
large inflows of foreign capital, mostly in the form of covered 
bonds or interbank loans, neither of which is loss-absorbing. 
In the case of Ireland some loss absorption occurred 
because the large UK banks had a substantial exposure to Ireland 
and thus also absorbed some losses that occurred there, though 
the amounts are difficult to ascertain. 
Against the original expectation that borders would no 
longer matter within a common currency area, there has been 
little cross-border integration of the banking sector within the 
euro area. But much more has occurred within the EU with large 
T
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banks from the older member states taking over most of the 
banking systems in the new member states (west-east). This take-
over of the local banking system was driven by the fact that the 
knowledge of how to run a bank had disappeared in the decades 
under the socialist system. The penetration of foreign banks was 
particularly strong in the small Baltic states, where Nordic banks 
had a market share of 80-90%. These banks had made large 
profits during the boom years, but then experienced large losses 
when the credit and real estate boom in the region ended 
abruptly in 2008-09, (Buch, Körner & Weigert, 2013: 9). Foreign 
banks thus absorbed most of the losses that occurred with the 
busts in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is interesting to note 
that the only exception to the dominance of foreign banks 
occurred in Latvia, where one significant local bank remained, 
but its problems almost pushed the government into insolvency. 
The experience of the Baltic states shows that integration 
via equity markets (ownership) can mimic the shock-absorbing 
properties of a banking union: foreign-owned banks can absorb 
losses. However, this mechanism works only if the (until now 
national) supervisor allows them to maintain exposure. This 
willingness of the Swedish (and other Nordic) supervisors to 
allow their banks to maintain their exposure in the Baltic states 
and to recapitalise their subsidiaries there was a crucial element 
in stabilising the financial sector in the region. 
Another condition for loss absorption by ‘foreign banks’ to 
be stabilising is that the foreign-owned banks must be strong 
enough to carry substantial losses. This condition was fulfilled 
since the Swedish and other banks that had large exposures in 
the Baltic states were able to absorb substantial losses, given that 
the business in their home base remained solid and given that 
their home economies were running large current account 
surpluses, which effectively insulated them from the flight of 
cross-border capital which started in 2010-11 when the broader 
financial crisis became the euro crisis. 
The European experience has also shown that a strong 
presence of foreign banks can lead to a propagation of financial 
shocks abroad to the domestic economy. This happened during 
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the first leg of the financial crisis when the large banks from the 
older member states came under funding stress and started to 
pull back capital and credit lines from their subsidiaries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. These banks came from countries 
like Italy, Austria or Belgium, whose fiscal and balance of 
payments position was weaker than those of the Scandinavian 
countries (like Sweden) whose banks dominated the Baltic 
banking market. This pullback by the foreign parents 
contributed to the economic downturn throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe, and threatened to initiate a self-reinforcing 
spiral of a withdrawal of financial support from the foreign 
parents, a deeper recession and therefore more local losses, 
prompting the foreign parents to accelerate their withdrawal. 
Moreover, each individual parent bank initially acted in 
isolation, hoping that the economic impact of its withdrawal 
would be limited since other banks could at least in principle 
take its place in financing the local economy.  
It took an international initiative, coordinated by the 
international financial institutions, to bring the handful of key 
parent banks from Western Europe together. Under this so-
called ‘Vienna Initiative’, the banks promised not to reduce their 
exposure to Central and Eastern European countries and the IMF 
agreed to provide the countries with substantial balance-of-
payments support. This combination was sufficient to arrest the 
vicious circle described above since it helped to stabilise the 
economies in the region. This result, in turn, limited the losses 
for the parent banks, thus also providing a justification for the 
banks to continue to provide financing in the region. 
This episode illustrates the general economic principle that 
‘there is no free lunch’. Large cross-border or cross-regional 
banks can mitigate the local impact of local financial shocks, but 
they also propagate shocks to the overall financial system to all 
regions in which they play an important role.  
To return to the US example, one could thus argue that the 
presence of the large US banks throughout the US provided a 
shock-absorbing mechanism for Nevada or Florida, but also a 
shock-propagating mechanism for the northern states which did 
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not experience a real estate boom. The financial crisis, which 
started when the sub-prime boom burst, led to a tightening of 
credit availability throughout the US, although the boom had 
been rather concentrated in a few states, as documented above. 
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4. WHO PAYS FOR THE SHOCK 
ABSORBERS? 
ne key issue for any shock-absorber mechanism is 
whether the mechanism is self-financing or needs public 
funding. This issue has played a key role in the political 
debate, both in the US and in the EU. The political slogan has 
been that ‘the industry’ should pay for its own mistake, and that 
‘taxpayer money’ should not be used to bail out banks. These 
principles were at the basis of the construction of the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM)  and its Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF), which will be financed by contributions from industry. 
The size of the SRF could be kept relatively small because 
another piece of EU legislation, namely the Bank Resolution and 
Recovery Directive (BRRD), established tough rules on the ‘bail-
in’ of creditors before a bank can receive financial support from 
the SRF. Ex ante, there is thus a clear intention to make the key 
pillar of the banking union in the eurozone self-financing, 
obviating the need for financial support from the budgets of 
member states.  
It is of course too early to say whether the European 
banking union will be ‘self-financing’.  
In the US there are two ‘official’ shock-absorber 
mechanisms (the FDIC and securitisation by the GSEs), which 
have been operating for long enough to measure whether, ex 
post, the system did finance itself, i.e. whether the costs that had 
to be sustained were on average borne by the industry. 
Since these two systems are of a different nature, they have 
to be discussed separately. 
O
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4.1 FDIC 
Historically, the losses of the FDIC have come in two waves: the 
savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s and 1990s and the ‘sub-
prime’ crisis of the last decade. 
The losses the FDIC had to sustain after 2008 were greater 
than the fund it had accumulated during the previous boom 
years. At the start of the crisis, the FDIC had slightly over $50 
billion at its disposal, equivalent to about 1.2% of insured 
deposits. However, already about one year into the crisis, the 
available funding was about to run out. 
This is why the FDIC had to be supported by a large line of 
credit from the Treasury. The FDIC fund thus went negative to 
about $21 billion already in 2009-10, but it was replenished 
quickly because the FDIC was able to force banks to pre-pay 
assessments up to 2012, bringing the fund quickly back into the 
black. However, it will take another decade or so before the FDIC 
will again reach its target level of 1.25% of insured deposits.13 
The FDIC’s funding will thus be reconstituted by 
contributions from industry. This part of the US banking union 
thus needed liquidity support from the federal institutions 
during the biggest financial crisis in living memory. But in the 
end, the FDIC remained solvent. 
By contrast, a large part of the S&L crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s was ultimately borne by the federal budget. 
The S&L crisis was different.14 Over 1,000 so-called ‘thrifts’ 
were closed or otherwise subjected to intervention (of the 3,000 
that had existed before the crisis).15  
                                                   
13 For more detailed information see “FDIC Statistics at a glance” 
(www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2012mar/fdic.html). 
14 For a description of the savings and loan crisis in the US, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings_and_loan_crisis. 
15 A thrift is a financial institution focusing on taking deposits and 
originating home mortgages. Thrift banks often have access to low-cost 
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In this case the government was needed not for liquidity, 
but to bail out the institutions that were in principle responsible 
for insuring deposits at these institutions (the S&Ls had a 
separate deposit guarantee system). At the time the FDIC was 
not responsible for the ‘thrifts’ whose deposit guarantee system 
was organised separately on a sectoral basis. As the sector was 
much weakened after the crisis (and given that the losses were 
great relative to the size of the sector), it was not possible to 
recover the cost from the surviving institutions later. The total 
losses for US taxpayers amounted to about $130 billion or about 
1% of US GDP at the time.  
The S&L crisis was also different in that it involved large-
scale fraud and was not related to a system-wide weakness in 
other segments of the financial market. However, the S&L crisis 
was regionally very concentrated, with a few states, in particular 
Texas, accounting for most losses, as can be seen in Figure 7 
below in which states with zero losses are shown in solid filler 
and vertical lines, and those with losses above 3% are indicated 
by small dots, horizontal lines and circles. In this case again, 
however, there were no spillover effects for the budgets of Texas 
or the other states in which the S&L crisis was concentrated 
because the losses were first absorbed by the S&L safety net, 
which was organised on a nationwide basis. When that proved 
insufficient, the federal government assumed the remaining 
losses in order to make depositors whole. The losses assumed at 
the federal level amounted to over 10% of the GSP of Texas at the 
time. 
                                                   
funding from Federal Home Loan Banks, which allows for higher savings 
account yields to customers and increased liquidity for mortgage loans. It 
is also known as a “savings and loan association”. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of the losses from the S&L crisis sustained by 
FDIC and precursors (% of GSP) 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from FDIC documents. 
As an aside, one should note the important role of 
commercial real estate loans played during the S&L crisis. 
Commercial real estate is potentially riskier because the 
borrower is a limited liability company, thus the recovery value 
rests only on the value of the land and its buildings. In the case 
of single family mortgages, by contrast, the debtor remains in 
principle liable for the entire amount of the loan, even if the value 
of the is lower (deficiency payments). This is the case in at least 
some states in the US. An historical report by the FDIC on the 
S&L crisis concluded: 
… in 1980, banks that subsequently failed had 43 
percent of their total real estate loan portfolio in 
commercial real estate loans; by 1993 this had increased 
to about 69 percent. In contrast, non-failed banks were 
more conservatively invested: in 1980, 32 percent of 
their total real estate loan portfolio was invested in 
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commercial real estate loans, and by 1993 the 
percentage was still approximately the same.16 
4.2 Securitisation via US federal housing-market 
institutions  
The two GSEs package ‘conforming mortgages’, i.e. mortgages 
conforming to certain stringent criteria that ensure a very high 
probability of repayment, and sell them to investors as so-called 
mortgage backed securities (MBS). However, the securities 
issued by the GSEs are de facto ultimately guaranteed by the US 
federal government because the GSEs securitise only mortgages 
that have been insured by them or another federal housing 
finance institution. In principle, there should thus not be any 
losses for investors on any mortgage that enters into an MBS 
issued by the two GSEs. When a mortgage that is packaged and 
securitised by either of the GSEs goes into default, the loss is 
made good by the insurance arm of the GSE. This implies that 
the shareholders of the GSEs ultimately had to bear any losses 
when many households could not or did not want to service their 
mortgages. When the losses mounted, the federal government 
had to put additional capital into the GSEs; it thus appeared that 
the losses would have to be borne by the taxpayer. 
The losses of the GSEs on their mortgages were in general 
limited since they accepted only ‘conforming’ mortgages, i.e. 
those with sufficient documentation, proof of income, a fixed 
interest rate and a loan-to-value ratio typically at most 80%. 
However, during the boom years (2003-07), a large 
proportion of mortgages were non-conforming, most of them 
euphemistically called ‘sub-prime’ because they were lacking 
proper documentation, had ‘teaser’ rates (instead of the US 
standard of 30 years fixed) and were for a higher proportion of 
the value of the house than accepted by the GSEs (going in some 
cases above 100%). These ‘non-conforming’ mortgages were not 
eligible for securitisation by the two GSEs and were sold as so-
                                                   
16 See chapter 3, “An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and 
early 1990s” in FDIC (1997, pp 137-165).  
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called ‘private label’ MBS (mortgage-backed securities)  (see next 
section).  
There is little sign of a link between sub-prime origination 
and losses for the federal institutions. Indeed, it is a priori 
uncertain whether higher private (sub-prime) and higher 
‘conforming’ mortgage lending should go hand in hand: rising 
housing prices make sub-prime loans appear to be a safe bet, 
thus leading to higher sub-prime origination overall. But given 
housing prices (and building activity), a higher proportion of 
sub-prime origination should mean lower losses for the FDIC 
and the GSEs, as more of the risk is borne by the private sector. 
The GSEs had never experienced any overall losses before 
the ‘sub-prime’ crisis. This was because during normal times the 
loss rates on the ‘conforming’ mortgages that the GSEs insure 
and securitise are rather low and the insurance premia the GSEs 
were charging were, on average, sufficient to cover these small 
loss rates. Of course, the loss rates declined even further during 
the housing boom with its soaring housing prices of the early 
2000s. With rising housing prices, the value of the collateral 
increased. Even if the homeowner could not service the 
mortgage, the GSEs, which had kept loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
below 80%, were unlikely to make a loss when the underlying 
mortgage went into delinquency and the house (GSEs typically 
insure mortgages on single-family homes) had to be sold. 
However, this changed when housing prices started to fall in the 
wake of the financial crisis and unemployment soared. 
Widespread unemployment put many families in difficulty and 
the lower housing prices meant that foreclosure more often 
resulted in a loss. 
During the early years of the crisis, the GSEs thus suffered 
great losses, as documented above. These losses were greater 
than the capital they had. The government thus had to step in 
and refinance them. However, the losses incurred in the period 
2008-12 are now in the process of being made up, as the 
insurance premia have increased and delinquency rates are 
falling. This part of the US banking union is thus likely to become 
self-financing.  
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To put it in another way: the insurance against regional 
shocks provided de facto by the GSEs has in the end been 
financed entirely by investors (and mortgage holders). One key 
reason why the losses of the GSEs have now been made up is that 
only a very small proportion (6%) of the newer loans has a mark-
to-market LTV ratio above 100%, whereas that proportion was 
40% during the boom years 2005-08, as shown in the second to 
last column of the table below. It is thus not surprising that the 
delinquency ratio rose to almost 10% on the mortgages from the 
boom years, but is now only 0.35% for newer mortgages. 
Table 3. Selected credit characteristics of single-family conventional 
loans, by acquisition period (% of total) 
 As of 31 March 2013 
 Single-family 
conventional 
guarantee 
book of 
business 
Current 
estimated 
mark-to-
market 
LTV ratio 
Current 
mark-to-
market 
LTV ratio 
>100% 
Serious 
delinquency 
ratio 
New single-family 
book of business 69% 70% 6% 0.35% 
Legacy book of 
business     
2005-08 20% 96% 40% 9.77% 
2004 and prior 11% 56% 6% 3.57% 
Total single-family 
book of business 100% 74% 13% 3.02% 
Data source: Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report for the period ending 31 March 
2013, submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, p. 5 
(www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/ 
2013/q12013.pdf). 
4.3 Other (private label) securitisation  
During the credit boom many households were able to obtain 
mortgages even if the payment record and the credit score of the 
mortgage holder was below the minimum required by the GSEs 
or with an LTV ratio above the 80% permitted by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. These mortgages, which were not ‘conforming’ 
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to the standards of the GSE, were euphemistically called ‘sub-
prime’ and packed in securities called residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS)  and sold in different tranches, many 
of which were rated AAA because during the boom years 
housing prices were increasing and the loss rates on these loans 
were low. The AAA-rated tranches were sold to investors 
worldwide as they were considered a safe investment given the 
expectation that housing prices would continue to increase. 
This form of securitisation provided another important 
element of regional shock absorption because during the bust the 
default and delinquency rates on these mortgages rose even 
more than the conforming mortgages, which had been insured 
by the GSE (and the losses as a percent of the mortgage were 
higher). These private-label MBS were different from the covered 
bonds, which are widely used in Europe, in that the principal of 
the various tranches was not guaranteed. This system of risk 
distribution thus did not involve any public expenditure.  
The losses that arose in particular in those states where 
sub-prime lending had been most prevalent, e.g. Nevada and 
Florida, were thus not borne by the local banks in these states, 
but rather by the ultimate investors in the RMBS, many of which 
were banks from countries with excess savings, like Germany. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to document the loss absorption 
through this channel as there are no reliable statistics on the 
ultimate holders of the different private-label MBS. 
This is, of course, an ex-post view. One could also argue 
that the possibility to securitise sub-prime mortgages led to 
serious moral hazard problems as the originating banks and 
brokers had an incentive to originate as much business as 
possible without taking into account the ability of the borrower 
to service the mortgage since the risk of default would be borne 
by the holders of the RMBS. 
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4.4 Who pays in the end? The incidence of taxes in a 
competitive industry 
No taxpayer money was thus spent to support the official shock-
absorbing institutions of the US after the sub-prime crisis. In this 
sense the US provides a model of how to reach the often stated 
aim of having ‘industry’ pay for the cost of a financial crisis. 
However, the losses of the FDIC and the GSEs had to be 
borne by somebody. This collective somebody were financial 
sector shareholders and clients. The GSEs had little equity, thus 
most of the losses from the excess lending during the boom years 
had to be compensated by higher-risk premia paid by families 
who took their mortgage during the bust. Similarly, FDIC losses 
have to be compensated by new levies on bank deposits. General 
theorems of public finance imply that the cost of these additional 
levies will be ‘translated’ to customers in the form of lower 
returns on deposits or higher interest rates if banking is a 
competitive business. 
This is the basic conundrum facing those who hold that 
‘the industry’ should pay for its own mistakes because taxpayer 
money should not be used to shore up failing banks. Ex ante, 
capital flows into the industry up to the point at which it can be 
expected to earn a normal, risk-adjusted return. This implies that 
the cost of contributing to future bank rescues will be factored in 
by investors as an element in their decisions, leading them to 
demand higher-risk premia. This means that industry customers 
will ultimately bear the expected cost of future rescues in the 
form of lower deposit rates, higher lending rates or generally 
higher fees for banking services. The capital cushions 
accumulated by the higher-risk premia during tranquil times 
will then be needed when a crisis arises. Ex post, industry capital 
can then be used to pay for the cost of any rescues and it might 
thus appear that ‘the industry paid for its own mistake’. Ex ante, 
this is impossible to ensure in a competitive environment. 
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5. WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE 
EUROPEAN BANKING UNION? 
he key aim of the banking union was to break the ‘diabolic 
feedback loop’ between banks and sovereigns.17 With the 
legislative framework now in place, one could ask how 
regional instability would be dealt with under such a union. 
To illustrate the importance of the banking union, one 
needs only to perform the thought experiment of how the boom-
bust cycle in Ireland would have played out with the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) fully in operation, i.e. after the end of the 
transition period.18  
The most visible difference would of course arise during 
the downturn since the local banks would naturally run into 
difficulties as the local real estate boom turns to bust. If the Irish 
real estate bust had occurred under the banking union the 
consequences for the Irish government would have been quite 
different from what happened in 2008, 2009 and 2010 when the 
Irish government first felt obliged to give a blanket guarantee for 
all liabilities of its banks and then was prevented from bailing in 
the few instruments which were not covered by the guarantee. 
                                                   
17 In this context, Allard et al. (2013) emphasise that the inability to cope 
with shocks is a systemic problem, i.e. not just for the affected country, but 
also for others due to the rapid spillover of fiscal stress. 
18 Formally, it will take 10 years for the SRF to reach its target of €55 billion 
and the full merger of the national ‘compartments’ within the SRF will be 
achieved after eight years. This might appear a rather long transition, but 
the mutualisation will proceed relatively quickly at the beginning since 
60% of national compartments within the SRF will be merged after only 
two years. The gradual increase in the degree of mutualisation agreed 
corresponds to the proposal made by Gros & Schoenmaker (2012). 
T
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With the banking union in place, the funding for keeping 
Irish banks alive would have come from the SRF. The Irish 
government would have sustained losses only if the SRF had 
decided not to save the local banks and the losses had been so 
great that the national deposit insurance scheme would have had 
to intervene to ensure that no holder of an insured retail deposit 
made a loss. 
In the case of another Ireland-type real estate boom and 
bust the ECB would signal the banks in difficulty to the SRF, 
which would then decide whether to allow some banks to fail, 
put them into resolution or save them because they are judged 
systemic. The funds needed to save any banks (or enable an 
orderly resolution) would come from the SRF, not from the 
national government, as is the case today. 
The ‘diabolical’ feedback loop between weak banks and 
weak sovereigns, which was so destructive at the height of the 
euro crisis, should thus be broken from the start (Belke, 2014; 
Begg, 2014). 
Moreover, the banking union might also have limited the 
size of the booms and the size of the exposure of the national 
banking system to its real estate sector. National supervisors had 
a natural tendency to protect the independence of ‘their’ banks, 
thus limiting de facto in many cases cross-border mergers and 
acquisition and the formation of multinational banks. Cross-
border equity investment in the banking sector should now 
become more frequent, which constitutes a further stabilising 
factor as the experience of the Baltic countries has shown.  
In future a national real estate boom-bust cycle is thus 
likely to play out very differently. A future Ireland-type bust is 
less likely to entail severe distress for the sovereign. This does 
not mean that the Nevada scenario of no stress at all for the local 
sovereign would materialise, given that the other elements of the 
US banking union (securitisation via the GSEs, federal deposit 
insurance and large banks which operate throughout the area) 
are missing in Europe. But the extreme stress on sovereigns 
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observed in the cases of Ireland and Spain should become much 
less likely. 
Moreover, it is likely that the European institutions, not 
only the SSM but also the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), 
would have recognised the existence of a regional housing price 
boom, and would have been much more likely than a local 
supervisor to warn banks about excessive real estate valuations, 
thus limiting the extent of over-lending and construction.  
The potential losses for the SRF would anyway probably 
be lower than those incurred by the Irish government because of 
the bail-in rules under the BRRD, which mandates that public 
funds can be provided if not only shareholders but also some 
creditors have accepted a loss (have been ‘bailed in’) of 8% of the 
bank’s assets. This did not happen in the case of Ireland because 
at that time the entire euro area banking system was in difficulty, 
and because it was thought that letting any Irish banks fail would 
have sparked another panic, comparable to the one that followed 
the failure of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008. 
For banks subject to intervention by the SRF, it would of 
course become relevant whether the debt instruments that are 
bailed in are held predominantly by residents, local households 
or other local financial intermediaries. If other local financial 
institutions are heavily invested in the ‘bail in-able’ instruments 
of local banks an important channel would still remain for local 
contagion. This was up to now the case, as until 2008 a large part 
of cross-border investment within the euro area was in the most 
secure or short-term spectrum, such as short-term interbank 
deposits and covered bonds. By contrast, hybrid forms of capital, 
which would be the first to be bailed in, have been until now sold 
locally in Europe. One reason is that often these instruments are 
tailor-made to be tax efficient under the local legal system. 
Another reason is that the information needed to evaluate hybrid 
capital is also available mostly in the home country.  
In the specific case of Ireland a large part of the real estate 
lending had been financed by interbank deposits from other 
countries; and these deposits were mostly of a maturity longer 
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than seven days, and could thus have been bailed in under the 
new rules contained in the BRRD. If the BRRD had been in force 
the Irish crisis might have taken a different course. But it remains 
to be seen whether interbank deposits (with a maturity longer 
than seven days) will again become as important as they were 
until 2007-08. 
Another potential channel of contagion from banks to the 
sovereign arises from Article 109 of the BRRD which stipulates 
that the (national) deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) has to 
contribute to the funding of resolution to the extent of the losses 
the DGS would have faced if the bank in question had been left 
go bankrupt. This makes sense from the point of view of 
protecting the funds of the SRF, but it opens a Pandora’s box of 
practical issues. First of all, it is always very difficult to estimate 
the losses the opening of a bankruptcy procedure would 
produce. This could also be observed in the cases of the two 
major bankruptcies which happened during the 2008 crisis, 
namely Lehman Brothers and the Icelandic banks. Immediately 
after the insolvency proceedings were opened, the price of the 
unsecured bonds of these institutions fell drastically, sometimes 
to as little as less than 10% of their face value. However, the 
prices of these bonds rose strongly later as the insolvency 
proceedings advanced and it became clearer that the assets were 
worth more than had been thought originally (partially this was 
due to the general recovery of asset values which set in in 2009). 
Moreover, for any international bank or banking group it will be 
even more difficult to determine in which subsidiary of the 
group the losses are to be located. There are thus likely to be 
strong conflicts of interest among the national DGSs which 
insure the deposits of the subsidiaries in different countries. 
These valuation problems are particularly acute given that 
the decision on the bail-in and the involvement of the SRM will 
typically have to be taken over the course of a weekend. 
Fortunately, paragraph 5 of Article 109 BRRD limits the 
contribution of the DGS to one-half of the target level of funds 
the DGS in question contains. The target level of the funds for a 
DGS is typically less than 1% of GDP. The maximum 
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contribution the SRF can demand from any one DGS is thus less 
than one-half of 1% of GDP. 
The local contagion might of course be even stronger if the 
SRM lets some banks fail, i.e. if the SRF does not intervene. In 
this case the local DGS would have to bear at least part of the 
burden (provided the losses are larger than the bail-inable capital 
of 8% of assets). Moreover, when the losses are very large relative 
to the balance sheet of the bank(s) involved there is no limit to 
the size of the losses the DGS might have to cover. In the case of 
large international banking groups national DGSs might 
experience quite different loss rates. This constitutes another 
aspect of the conflicts of interest between the SRF and the 
(national) DGS, because a high contribution by the SRF to keep 
the bank in question afloat would mean a lower risk of losses for 
the DGS. Representatives of the SRF might thus argue that the 
local DGS should contribute to any rescue operation, although 
the latter has no legal obligation to do so as long as the bank is 
not formally insolvent.  
All in all, one can conclude the (incomplete) banking union 
created for the euro area is likely to diminish the strength of the 
feedback loop from weak banks to their national sovereign. 
However, large banks with very large losses could still create 
problems for their national government. 
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6. OPEN ISSUES FOR BANKING 
UNION 
his chapter deals with some of the open issues that remain 
if the banking union is to become a bulwark against 
regional financial shocks. The purpose is not to be 
exhaustive, but to briefly discuss some of the major issues that 
remain. Two short-term issues are the lack of a fiscal backstop 
for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and its financing via risk-
related contributions. A third issue concerns the lack of an 
agreement on a common deposit insurance scheme. Official 
decisions have recently been taken in both areas, but they appear 
to lack ambition.19 
The main financial element of the banking union will be 
the SRF. This fund will be created together with the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) via a separate Intergovernmental 
Agreement (IGA) and not via the normal procedure based on the 
EU Treaty. However, this legal particularity should not impair 
the proper functioning of the SRM as a ‘federal’ institution. 
Officially, the purpose of the SRF is not to absorb losses but 
only to provide temporary financing for banks that need to be 
restructured (Belke, 2014). Reality might be quite different, given 
that any policy on bank resolution suffers from acute time 
inconsistency: during tranquil times it is in the interest of the 
public authorities to announce that they do not intend to bail out 
                                                   
19 The agreement on the contributions to the SRF can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/banking-union/single-
resolution-mechanism/index_en.htm. The agreement on DGS can be 
found at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/ 
index_en.htm. 
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the creditors of any bank, hoping that this will make the creditors 
of banks aware of the risk they are running. 
When a bank experiences difficulties, however, there is 
always an extremely strong temptation to bail out either the bank 
itself or its creditors. The reason is that the insolvency of a bank 
can trigger extremely serious contagion effects and endanger 
systemic stability, as the default of Lehman Brothers clearly 
showed. However, this problem is not specific to the SRM; it 
affects all resolution funds when dealing with a potentially 
systemic crisis.20 
However, there remain two questions that are pertinent to 
the financing of the SRM. 
6.1 Can the SRF survive without a fiscal backstop? 
The size of the SRF has often been criticised as being 
underfunded. But this is largely mistaken. A fund of €55 billion 
would be sufficient to resolve all but the very largest banks in 
Europe (based on the rule of thumb that the cost of resolution 
usually does not exceed a small multiple of own funds). It would 
also be sufficient to deal with even a systemic crisis in small- to 
medium-sized countries (Spain needed €60 billion from the 
ESM). 
Moreover, the EU (draft) Regulation establishing the SRM 
specifies also that the SRF can, if needed, raise ex-post levies. For 
any given year the limit for the ex-post levies is three times the 
‘normal’ annual contributions, or 3 x 12.5 = 37.5% of the total 
(target) fund, or about €20 billion. Over time these ex-post levies 
could provide the SRF with important additional funding. 
The SRM is of course relatively small compared to the 
overall assets of the SSM banking system (which amount to over 
€25 trillion) and also small relative to the overall capital of the 
sector (about €1 trillion). But one cannot expect a resolution fund 
                                                   
20 See for example Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007), who stress the problem 
of ‘too many to fail’. Chari & Kehoe (2009) analyse the link with optimal 
regulation. Other contributions in this vein are Gimber (2012) and 
Grochulsky (2011). 
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to deal with the chronic under-capitalisation of the European 
banking sector (see also Beck, Gros & Schoenmaker, 2013). The 
resources of the SRF will be significant relative to the 
capitalisation of most individual banks (the 30 German banks 
directly under the SSM have on average capitalisation of only €10 
billion). Moreover, the resources of the SRF will loom large 
relative to the budget of any single member state, except the 
largest ones. 
Any restructuring fund can only be a first-aid kit for a 
small number of occasional accidents. A systemic crisis always 
requires a fiscal backstop. The euro area at present does not have 
such an explicit backstop in that it is not clear who would lend 
to the SRF should its funds not be sufficient to deal with a crisis 
which is systemic at the level of the euro area. (As argued above, 
the SRF should be able to deal with a systemic crisis in any small 
to medium-sized member country.)  
One can argue, however, that an implicit backstop exists, 
as experience has shown that during a crisis, when there was a 
need for public funds, they were found. The process was of 
course slow and cumbersome and the sluggish creation of the 
ESM made the crisis even worse. But there is now agreement that 
a (small) part of the resources of the ESM would be available for 
a direct recapitalisation of banks if a member country is not able 
to raise the funds on its own.21  
Moreover, if the resources committed for bank 
recapitalisation by the ESM should prove to be insufficient, it 
would take only a further political decision to provide a backstop 
to the SRF in the event of a truly systemic crisis. This choice will 
be politically natural once the ESM’s lending capacity of €700 
billion has been restored, which should be the case once the 
current programmes have ended and the funds have been 
reimbursed. It is clear that it would be preferable to have an 
explicit, Treaty-based, backstop for the SRF. A legal guarantee 
                                                   
21 For the official decision, see www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137569.pdf. 
50  GROS & BELKE 
 
does not seem to be indispensable, however, since it seems that 
even in the US the backing of the Treasury for the FDIC is based 
on a political decision taken a long time ago, rather than being 
mandated by law.22 
6.2 How to discourage risk-taking via the 
contributions to the SRF 
There is general agreement that the banking sector should pay 
for its own safety net. Resolution and deposit guarantee funds 
should thus be financed by contributions from the banks 
themselves. This principle is at the basis of the approach taken in 
the EU Directive on (national) DGSs that has recently been 
passed. And it is also enshrined in the basic rules of the SRF, 
which will be at the disposal of the SRM that has also been 
recently approved (see Article 69 of the SRM Regulation). 
Moreover, there is also general agreement that the 
contributions individual banks pay to the resolution (or deposit 
guarantee) fund should be based on the riskiness of the bank 
itself. This is essential to providing individual banks with the 
proper incentives.  
However, in reality a practical problem arises: resolution 
or deposit guarantee funds (whether national DGS or the SRF) 
also have a target level, usually as a percentage of deposits or 
some other liability. Once this target level has been reached, 
                                                   
22 On the issue of the ‘full faith and credit’ backing for the FDIC, one finds 
the following explanation: In light of apparent systemic risks facing the 
banking system, the adequacy of FDIC’s financial backing has come into 
question. Beyond the funds in the Deposit Insurance Fund above and the 
FDIC’s power to charge insurance premia, FDIC insurance is additionally 
assured by the federal government (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Federal_Deposit_Insurance_Corporation).According to FDIC.gov (as of 
March 2013), “FDIC deposit insurance is backed by the full faith and credit 
of the United States government. This means that the resources of the 
United States government stand behind FDIC-insured depositors.” The 
statutory basis for this claim is less than clear. Congress, in 1987, passed a 
non-binding “Sense of Congress” to that effect, but there appear to be no 
laws strictly binding the government to make good on any insurance 
liabilities unmet by the FDIC. 
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contributions are no longer needed (see Article 69 of the SRM 
Regulation). But this implies that the incentive effect of linking 
contributions to risk factors at the individual bank level no 
longer operates once the target level has been reached at the level 
of the overall fund. 
The problem can be solved in two ways (see Box 1). One 
way would be to keep assessing contributions even after the fund 
has reached its target level, but provide banks with a refund 
based on their past contributions. The ongoing contributions 
would then be based on current risk levels (in terms of riskiness 
and magnitude of insured deposits), thus providing the right 
incentives. 
Box 1. Contributions to a bank resolution fund: Conceptual 
underpinnings 
The usual approach is to set the annual flow, i.e. the contribution of 
each bank for each year, as simply a function of its liabilities base (of 
that year) and certain risk factors (measured for that year or some 
recent past average): 
ܿ݋݊ݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧(ݎ݅ݏ݂݇ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ)ܮ௜,௧  
where the alpha denotes the contribution rate of bank i, which 
will be a function of its riskiness. The liabilities base on which 
contribution rates, alpha, are defined is not material for the problem 
at hand. The alpha can be calibrated in such a way that the target 
level of the fund is reached in a number of years (ten in Europe). 
The main limitation of this approach is that contributions stop 
when the target level has been reached, i.e. when the sum of all past 
contributions (neglecting interest the fund earns on its investments) 
is larger than the target level.  
෍ ܿ௜,௧
௧,௜ ≥ ݋ݒ݁ݎ݈݈ܽ	ݐܽݎ݃݁ݐ	݈݁ݒ݈݁ = ݔ ൤෍ ܮ௜௜ ൨ /100 
In the case of Europe, the target level would be equal to a 
percentage x of the liabilities base, which has to be calculated as a 
function of the ratio between covered deposits and the liability base 
for contributions (x = covered deposits/liabilities). After 10 years, 
contributions would thus stop and the risk factors would cease to 
have an incentive effect. 
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A simple way to ensure that the incentive effect of risk-based 
contributions is preserved beyond the transition period is to 
stipulate that the annual contributions have to be paid each year, 
irrespective of the size of the fund. But there would be an additional 
rule: each bank also receives a transfer back which is proportional 
to its share in the total pot accumulated so far.  
Under this computationally simple way to preserve the 
incentive effects of risk-based contributions, the annual net transfer 
a bank has to make to the resolution fund would be calculated thus: 
݊݁ݐ	݌ܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ = ݊ܿ௜,் = ܿ௜,் − ∑ ܿ௜,௧்௧ୀ଴ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ	݈݁ݒ݈݁ 
where ∑ ܿ௜,௧்௧ୀ଴  denotes the sum of all past payments made by 
bank i. 
Under this system the incentive effects of the risk-based 
factors would persist even after the target level has been reached. 
The net amount a bank would have to transfer to the system, 
i.e. the difference between its annual contribution and its pro rata 
reimbursement, could thus become negative (and indeed on 
average half of the banks would face net negative ‘contributions’).  
Alternative approach: 
At time t the overall target stock of capital bank i should have 
contributed to the resolution fund is defined as: 
ܥ௜ ,௧∗ = ߙ௜,௧(ݎ݅ݏ݂݇ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ)ܮ௜,௧ 
where the alpha denotes again the contribution rate of bank i, 
which should be a function of its risk factors (capital base, etc.). 
The annual contribution bank i would have to transfer to the 
resolution fund could be one-tenth of the difference between the 
target capital level and the sum of the actual transfer bank i has 
made in the past (neglecting interest the fund earned, which would 
have to be offset against its running costs). 
Formally, the annual contribution, denoted by a lower case c, 
in year T, would be given by: 
ܿ௜,் = ൣܥ௜ ,்∗ −∑ ܿ௜,௧்௧ୀ଴ ൧10  
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Under this system the incentive effects of the risk-based 
factors would remain intact even after the resolution fund has 
reached its target level of 1% of covered deposits. Banks whose risk 
has fallen relative to the past would receive a reimbursement and 
banks whose riskiness has increased would continue to have to pay. 
The same applies to increases/falls in the liabilities which form the 
base for the contribution: banks whose liabilities increase (more 
than the system average) continue to pay whereas those whose 
liability base falls receive reimbursements. 
 
Another approach would be to define a target level for the 
stake each bank has in the resolution fund. This stake is given by 
the sum of its past contributions to the fund. As shown in Box 1, 
this would be subtly different from the usual approach of 
defining an annual contribution based on present risk levels. 
The box also shows that if one wants to preserve the 
incentive effects of risk-based contributions beyond the 
transition period, one needs to keep the annual contributions, 
irrespective of the size of the fund. But, to keep the fund limited, 
there would be an additional rule that, once the target level has 
been reached, each bank also receives a transfer back in 
proportion to its share in the total pot accumulated so far. Under 
this approach the incentive effects of the risk-based factors 
would persist even after the target level has been reached. 
The net amount a bank would have to transfer to the 
system, i.e. the difference between its annual contribution and its 
pro rata reimbursement, could thus become negative for those 
banks whose risk profile improves. (In a no-growth situation. on 
average. half of the banks would face net negative 
‘contributions’.) 
One needs thus to make a clear distinction between the 
annual flows of payments to the fund (contributions) and the 
stock of cumulated contributions to the fund which denote for 
each bank the stake or capital that the bank has contributed to 
the fund in the past. Unfortunately, this principle has not been 
recognised in the agreement of 21 October 2014, on the “ex-ante 
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contributions to the Single Resolution Fund” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/banking-
union/single-resolution-mechanism/index_en.htm). The 
contributions to the SRM will thus not contribute to pricing risk-
taking by individual banks once the target level of the funds has 
been reached. 
6.3 Separating resolution and deposit insurance: 
Principles of a two-tier European deposit 
(re)insurance system  
As mentioned above, it is widely agreed that a full banking union 
comprises three elements, namely common supervision, 
common funding for restructuring and common deposit 
insurance. Many academic observers (see, for example, the 
contributions to Beck, 2012) stress the need to introduce all three 
elements together. However, deposit insurance has de facto been 
dropped from the official agenda.23  
This does not imply that nothing has been done regarding 
deposit insurance at the EU level. The European Commission 
tabled a proposal for a directive on DGS in 2010.24 The directive 
has in the meantime been adopted (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm).   
However, the scope of this ‘DGS’ directive is quite limited 
as it aims only at harmonising coverage, the arrangements for 
pay-out, e.g. the time limit for paying out depositors, and the 
financing of national DGSs. The Commission has so far only 
proposed “mutual borrowing between DGSs, i.e. a borrowing 
facility in certain circumstances”. Somewhat surprisingly, an 
accompanying Joint Research Centre report (JRC, 2011) on 
                                                   
23 The blueprint of the European Commission for a ‘genuine EMU’ contains 
only a passing reference to the need for “solid deposit guarantee schemes 
in all Member States”. Some have argued that it is not needed and others 
that it is just politically too contentious, e.g. Pisani-Ferry & Wolf (2012). 
24 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/ 
20100712_proposal_en.pdf. 
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deposit insurance at the EU level does not consider the 
reinsurance model at all. 25 
The case for maintaining deposit insurance at the national 
level used to be that the national level remains best qualified to 
evaluate idiosyncratic risks of the banks under its watch. 
National DGSs should also have the right incentive to monitor 
individual banks as they would have to pay for any losses. In 
reality, however, most national DGSs (and national supervisors 
in general) operate within so many political constraints that they 
have little influence, except on very small banks. At any rate, 
with supervision now concentrated in the SSM (effectively the 
ECB) the case of retaining deposit insurance has been 
fundamentally weakened. 
The fact that the ECB will be the direct supervisor of only 
the largest 120 banks might strengthen the case of leaving all the 
other smaller banks under national deposit insurance, but the 
SRM will cover all banks. 
Moreover, a little noticed part of the SRM agreement 
stipulates that the SRM can require (national) DGSs to make a 
contribution to the resolution of banks up to the amount of the 
losses the DGS would have made if the SRM had not intervened, 
i.e. the bank would have gone into insolvency. This makes sense 
from a theoretical point of view: if the SRM puts its funds into a 
bank and thus helps a DGS to avoid a loss, this advantage for the 
DGS should be compensated. However, while this approach 
seems theoretically logical it is likely to be totally impractical 
because the amount the DGS(s) would have to contribute to the 
resolution of a bank under the SRM would have to be 
determined in a few hours during a frantic a weekend. 
                                                   
25 Under the heading “Pan-EU DGS”, this report “explored the option to 
establish a pan-EU DGS, either:  
a. in the form of a single entity replacing the existing schemes, or 
b. in the form of a complementary fund to existing DGS (‘28th 
regime’), or 
c. structured as a network of schemes providing each other with 
mutual assistance (‘European system of DGS’).” 
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Moreover, the determination of how much a DGS would have 
lost in case the SRM had not intervened (and the bank thus 
would have gone into insolvency) can never be determined 
objectively. 
This is not just a general consideration, but a real life 
problem. When the Icelandic banks went insolvent, institutions 
had collected deposits in several countries. Although these banks 
had operated through branches, the national authorities felt 
compelled to compensate savers in their country as if the 
branches had been covered by the national DGS (because the 
Icelandic deposit insurance system also became effectively 
insolvent). At the time (2008), it appeared that his would impose 
a great cost on national taxpayers in Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands. However, the end result was quite different from 
the initial fears. The German DGS was able to recover most of the 
cost it incurred compensating German savers because it was able 
to seize some assets in Germany and then wait patiently until 
these assets recovered in value. The UK and Dutch governments 
brought a court case against the Icelandic government, as they 
were not able to recover any assets in their countries. However, 
over time the estate of the Icelandic banks was able to recover 
much more than initially assumed, given that depositors had a 
preference over many other creditors. More than one half of the 
losses have thus already been covered. The FDIC has had a 
similar experience in recent years. In some cases it had to revise 
its losses considerably downwards over time. 
In real life insolvency cases the estimates of the recovery 
value of assets can thus vary greatly over time. However, if the 
SRM intervenes the cost of insolvency cannot be observed and 
can only be estimated as a counterfactual. There will thus be an 
unavoidable conflict of interest between the SRM and (national) 
DGS. 
These difficulties would of course multiply for 
internationally active banks (with different subsidiaries in 
different countries, which remains the dominant model). The 
SRM would thus have to determine over a weekend how much 
each national DGS would have to contribute in an insolvency of 
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the group. This seems next to impossible given that one would 
have to determine what assets would be a disposable for 
different national authorities – a process that would likely take 
years and many lengthy court cases. 
The cases of the Icelandic banks and of the cajas in Spain 
shows that the real problem in deposit insurance is not the 
problems posed by individual banks, but by system risk. 
Experience confirms again and again that national authorities are 
not well placed to evaluate systemic risk, i.e. risks to their entire 
banking system. As discussed extensively above, the main 
source of such shocks which often threaten the entire national 
banking system are local real estate booms and busts. 
The national real estate bubbles were not recognised as 
such in Spain or Ireland, although foreign observers and EU 
institutions had repeatedly warned about unsustainable 
developments. Moreover, national authorities are also not well 
placed in practice to deal with banks that are well connected at 
the national political level, either because of size (‘national 
champions’) or because of the nature of their business (banks 
financing local real estate development). This fosters the 
accumulation of large risks and delays in loss recognition once 
the bubble bursts. A local real estate bubble which had been 
financed by local institutions with local deposits might also 
constitute a case in which the SRM might thus be the most likely 
case under which a large number of local banks would incur 
large losses with high pay-outs required from the national DGS. 
There is thus a need to reinsure national deposit insurance 
systems against large, systemic events.26  
The need for reinsurance thus arises even without 
considering the specific problems posed by large cross-border 
bank groups. In reality, most large cross-border banks operate 
via subsidiaries. These subsidiaries contribute to the DGS of their 
host countries the same way as purely national banks do, and the 
national DGS would have to pay out should one of these large 
                                                   
26 Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012) arrive at the same conclusion. 
58  GROS & BELKE 
 
cross-border banks fail. This provides some automatic burden-
sharing.  
However, the burden-sharing is limited to the case of 
cross-border banks operating with subsidiaries. Losses at large 
cross-border banking groups (mostly classified as SIFIs, or 
significantly important financial institutions) pose other 
problems, as the distribution of assets across subsidiaries will 
determine where the losses arise. The experience with Fortis has 
clearly shown this phenomenon. SIFIs are usually saved by 
government intervention because of the threat they pose to 
systemic stability.  
Deposit insurers are thus not directly involved and 
anyway do not constitute the largest creditors because these 
large institutions are mostly universal banks for which deposit-
taking is only one part of the overall business model with 
customer deposits amounting usually to less than one-half of the 
balance sheet. Figure 8 below shows the share of customer 
deposits by bank size (measured as total assets) of the more than 
100 euro area banks subjected to at least one of the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and European Bank 
Authority (EBA) exercises between 2010 and 2014 or the ECB 
Comprehensive Assessment in 2014, which covered for all the 
member countries the largest banks accounting for at least one-
half of assets at the national level.27 
                                                   
27 The 2010 stress test exercise was conducted on a sample of 91 European 
banks. In total, national supervisory authorities from 20 EU member states 
participated in the exercise. In each of the 27 member states, the sample 
was built by including banks, in descending order of size, so as to cover at 
least 50% of the respective national banking sector, as expressed in terms 
of total assets. As the stress test was conducted at the highest level of 
consolidation for the bank in question, the exercise also covers subsidiaries 
and branches of these EU banks operating in other member states and in 
countries outside Europe. As a result, for the remaining seven member 
states where more than 50% of the local market was already covered 
through the subsidiaries of EU banks participating in the exercise, no 
further bank was added to the sample. The 91 banks represent 65% of the 
total assets of the EU banking sector as a whole. For about 10 of these banks 
no data on customer deposits was available.  
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Figure 8. The relative importance of deposits as a function of bank size 
 
Source: CEPS database (see Ayadi & De Groen, 2014). 
Existing mutual guarantee schemes provide another 
rationale for reinsurance. These schemes, notably among the 
German savings banks, exist usually among groups of small 
savings institutions, all of which have a very similar business 
model. Groups of banks with a mutual guarantee system 
constitute essentially one large bank from the point of view of a 
deposit insurance system. There is no reason to dissolve systems 
that have worked well so far. But these groups clearly are not 
immune to systemic risk. A first reinsurance layer for groups of 
savings or cooperative banks which have a mutual guarantee 
agreement could be provided at the national level. But this is not 
sufficient since these groups account for a large share of deposits 
in some countries and could thus overtax the loss absorption 
capacity of the national authorities. 
There has been some debate about the need for a European 
approach to deposit insurance (for a survey see Belke, 2014). For 
example, Pisani-Ferry & Wolff (2012) argued that a common 
deposit insurance fund is not needed. The reason given was that 
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actually strengthens the case made here for the need for some 
backup for national DGSs that experience a shock that is systemic 
at the national level, but not at the euro area level. The experience 
with Spain and Ireland has shown that this type of shock can 
certainly arise. Depositor confidence everywhere should be 
strengthened if it is known that there exists a credible backup for 
national deposit insurance funds.28 
Box 2. The FDIC as an example for Europe? 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)  in the US is 
an independent institution with a considerable staff which can 
monitor and assess the risk posed by the thousands individual 
banks operating in the US. 
A key aspect of the FDIC is that it is completely 
unconcerned by the local political difficulties that might arise 
when it swoops in and resolves an ailing bank over a weekend. 
During this crisis the FDIC has been able to resolve hundreds of 
(admittedly mostly small) banks, whereas in Europe very few 
banks have been resolved or allowed to fail. However, some of 
the banks dealt with by the FDIC had balance sheets which were 
larger than those of the banks in Cyprus and even most cajas in 
Spain. What qualifies as small for the FDIC (and probably for the 
SRM as well) could thus be relevant in the context of smaller 
member states. 
The FDIC follows a strict ‘waterfall’ of claims with junior 
debt first to be wiped out and even senior bondholders often 
suffering large haircuts. The FDIC model would thus be 
preferable for the EU as well, but unfortunately it does not seem 
to have any chance of being adopted at present.  
                                                   
28 If a common deposit insurance of this form remains absent due to worries 
about moral hazard, the euro area will most likely remain less integrated 
financially. This is because the scope for private financial flows to 
accommodate asymmetric shocks would be restricted. Credit institutions 
would stay retrenched within national boundaries, limiting the supply of 
credit in weaker economies, inhibiting their capacity to restore growth and 
employment. See Begg (2014) and Howarth & Quaglia (2013). 
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It is interesting to note that one of the key arguments for 
the creation of the FDIC was the fact that deposit guarantee had 
been a responsibility of the states. But during the crisis of the early 
1930s, most of the deposit schemes at the state level had become 
insolvent (Golembe, 1960) as contagion led to a cascade of local 
banking panics which overwhelmed the capacity of the local 
DGSs of the time.   
One of the key reasons why state deposit insurance systems 
failed was that the small undiversified banks exposed to local real 
estate bubbles and agricultural difficulties were prone to systemic 
crisis (Thies & Gerlowski, 1989). This problem remains even 
today. The Spanish and Irish deposit insurance funds would be 
overwhelmed by the multiple failures within a small 
undiversified group of banks resulting from a local boom and 
bust. Federal reinsurance would diversify this risk of local shocks. 
The need to provide insurance against systemic shocks 
remains today as important as ever. This need motivates the 
following concrete proposal. 
6.4 Basic principles of reinsurance 
Gros (2013) proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and 
reinsurance to deposit insurance. The basic idea is simple: 
Existing national DGSs would continue to operate much as 
before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but 
they would be required to take out reinsurance against risks that 
would be too large to be covered by them. A ‘European 
Reinsurance Fund’ (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance 
financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any 
reinsurance company does in the private sector. The EReIF 
would pay out only in case of large losses. This ‘deductible’ 
would provide the national authorities with the proper 
incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilise depositor 
confidence even in the case of large shocks.29  
                                                   
29 It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance 
fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from 
the current crisis. 
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A first point is that what is needed is reinsurance, not a 
mutual guarantee among all national DGSs. This implies that the 
reinsurance scheme proposed here will not put the deposits of 
savers in ‘virtuous’ countries at risk – their potential losses 
would be limited to their share in the common fund. 
Three other principles also need to be stressed: the 
compulsory nature, the need for independent management and 
premia based on systemic, or macroeconomic risk, and the 
transition. 
6.4.1 Compulsory reinsurance with a deductible 
The compulsory element is indispensable. Otherwise, a serious 
adverse selection bias would arise. Differences in risk profiles are 
no reason to allow any national DGS to opt out.  
(National) Deductible: As for any insurance, there should be 
a first loss tranche, or deductible, which is borne at the national 
level. This means that the losses that might arise if a small- to 
medium-sized bank fails would have to be covered by the 
national DGS alone. This ‘deductible’ should be of such a size 
that the national DGS could pay out without endangering its 
own viability. It should be proportional to the size of the national 
fund accumulated, which in turn should be large enough to deal 
with the failure of any single domestic bank (but not necessarily 
the EU-wide deposits of the large cross-border banking groups). 
The Commission has proposed to set as a target for each national 
DGS a fund equivalent to 1.5% of (insured) deposits. The 
national DGSs should then dedicate a part of the risk premia they 
collect from their banks to reinsure themselves with the EReIF. 
As a rough guess, about one-third to one-half of the premia 
collected at the national level might be needed for the 
reinsurance against systemic or large national shocks.  
The contract between the EReIF and the national DGS 
would thus specify that the EReIF would pay out if, over a period 
to be specified (say two or three years), the total claims on the 
national DGS exceed by, e.g. two times, the fund accumulated 
nationally. Another way to specify the reinsurance event would 
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be to fix the deductible (or national first loss piece) in terms of a 
percentage of GDP. 
Reinsurance is thus completely different from lending 
among national DGSs, as proposed by the European 
Commission. A national DGS will need financial support only if 
the country experiences a systemic crisis. But these are exactly 
the conditions under which the other DGS systems will not want 
to lend and it will be difficult to force the stronger DGSs to lend 
to others in crisis. Moreover, this mutual lending will constitute 
a vehicle for contagion, which should be avoided.30 
There will be limits to the amount the EReIF pays out. The 
limit is likely to be large enough to cover systemic events in 
small- to medium-sized member states. The empirical literature 
indicates that the average cost of a banking crisis is around 5% of 
GDP. Even for a country like Spain, this would translate into €50 
billion, and should thus be manageable by a fund of this order of 
magnitude. 
A systemic shock to a large country could not be handled 
by the EReIF alone. In such a case, recourse to the ESM will be 
unavoidable because any systemic crisis of a large member 
country will lead to systemic consequences for the entire euro 
area economy. It will then be up to the fiscal authorities 
represented in the ESM to decide whether European taxpayers’ 
money should be used to intervene.  
How much protection could be provided by the 
reinsurance model proposed here? If one assumes that one-half 
of the premia are needed to cover systematic risk, the protection 
provided by the EReIF would be inverse to the size of the 
country. For example, for a small country which accounts only 
for 5% of all deposits, the common fund would be 20 times as 
large as the national fund. Even for a country accounting for 10% 
of all deposits, e.g. Spain, the EReIF would still be 10 times larger 
than the national fund and thus be much more able to deal with 
a loss that might be too large to be dealt with at the national level.  
                                                   
30 A 2011 study of the Joint Research Centre (JRC)  of the EU did not 
consider the reinsurance approach. See Joint Research Centre (2011). 
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6.4.2 Premiums and management 
Risk premia should of course reflect differences in risk. Systemic 
events materialise rarely. It will thus be very difficult to calculate 
the appropriate premia. There will be long periods during which 
no systemic event occurs, and of course it is hoped that many 
countries will never experience a systemic crisis in a given 
lifetime. But one could use the expertise of the large European 
reinsurance industry to assess the proper premium for this type 
of rare event. A real institution will be needed; a mere ‘post box’ 
system without expertise at the centre will not work because it 
would not be able to properly assess the risk of the national DGS. 
It is of course essential that the institution that sets the premia for 
the reinsurance is completely independent of political influence 
in its risk assessment. This seems to exclude the ESM in its 
present form because its staff has little autonomy under a board 
that is dominated by the national finance ministers whose main 
mandate is to look after the interests of their national taxpayers, 
and not the stability of the whole system. 
The EReIF would not need to have expert knowledge in 
bank management, but would need to look out for systemic, 
macroeconomic risk. In principle, this expertise is already 
available in the ESRB. It would thus be important to find an 
institutional solution under which this expertise can be used by 
the EReIF. For example, the EReIF could be empowered to 
increase the premia it charges the national DGSs concerned if the 
national authorities had ignored a warning and a 
recommendation from the ESRB to undertake certain actions to 
forestall a potential danger to price stability.31 
The EReIF should also be able to judge the overall quality 
of the national DGSs, which requires expertise in systems 
management, rather than analysts of bank balance sheets. The 
EReIF should thus have the right to inspect the practical working 
                                                   
31 A warning under the excessive imbalances procedure (EIP), which is 
managed by the Commission and decided by the ECOFIN Council, could 
of course be taken as another signal to the EReIF that the DGS of the 
country in question faces a greater risk of a systemic event. 
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of national DGSs, checking for example whether premia are 
properly adjusted for risk (as required already by the EU 
Directive on DGS). Here it could benefit from the expertise of the 
Directorate General for Competition Policy (DG Comp) of the 
European Commission. In the private sector such supervision of 
the reinsured is usually not feasible. This is why a fundamental 
principle of private reinsurance contracts is “The Duty of Utmost 
Good Faith” (Devery & Farrell, 2008).32 Under this principle, the 
EReIF should be present at the table once a national DGS is 
nearing the borderline where a pay-out from the EReIF would be 
triggered. The EReIF would then need to give its consent to 
measures that would reduce loss-absorption capacity. Here 
again, a collaboration with DG Comp would make sense.  
6.4.3 Transition 
For a two-tier system like the one proposed here, the transition 
should be relatively straightforward to manage. Presumably 
there will be no need for immediate pay-outs (assuming no 
systemic crisis arises again). This implies that the reinsurance 
function can be built up gradually as do the funds in the EReIF. 
The legacy problems from the current crisis should have 
been dealt with in the meantime by the Asset Quality Review 
which the ECB conducted in 2014 prior to becoming the direct 
supervisor of the 120 largest euro area banks.  
A new, two-tier deposit insurance system could thus start 
anytime, with the EReIF gradually building up its capital. The 
next systemic crisis will be different from the euro crisis and, it is 
hoped, far enough in the future to allow enough time to build a 
new institution and accumulate enough funding to counter it. 
                                                   
32 “One of the most fundamental principles in reinsurance – indeed, what 
sets the reinsurance field apart from most other industries – is the concept 
of utmost good faith (also known as ‘uberrimae fides’). The duty originated 
in the context of marine insurance law, when underwriters had no practical 
means of inspecting reinsured ships or cargo in distant ports.” 
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7. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: 
FISCAL UNION AND FINANCIAL 
SHOCK ABSORBER 
 key finding of this study is that a common backup 
system for banks combined with the overall integration 
of national financial systems greatly increase the ability 
of financial markets to reduce the negative spillovers among 
members of a monetary union resulting from national or regional 
financial crisis. This finding is confirmed in more 
macroeconomic terms by the empirical literature which 
measures the channels of stabilisation of regional income in 
existing monetary unions, like the US and Germany. For 
example, Asdrubali, Sorensen & Yosha (1996) find that in the US, 
around 40% of shocks to per capita GSP is smoothed by capital 
markets and around 25% by credit markets. This implies that 
about two-thirds of shocks to state income are absorbed by 
financial markets. Similarly, Athanasoulis & van Wincoop (2001) 
find that around 70% of the shocks in the US are smoothed 
through private and public risk-sharing mechanisms: financial 
markets play the biggest role, allowing around 60% of the total 
smoothing of income after a shock, while the federal fiscal policy 
covers the other 10%. More recently, Hepp & von Hagen (2013) 
find that for Germany, in the pre-unification period, most of the 
smoothing was provided by the federal tax-transfer and grant 
system (55%), while for the post-unification period, factor 
income flows have become the most important channel 
(contributing about 51% of total income smoothing).  
The introduction of the euro and the common payments 
infrastructure has reduced barriers to financial integration, and 
credit flows via the wholesale interbank market have boosted 
A
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financial integration as measured by the size of cross-border 
flows and stocks. This was expected to facilitate risk-sharing 
among investors.  
However, the euro crisis has shown that sometimes larger 
cross-border financial flows and stock can actually be at the 
origin of a crisis (Mink & de Haan, 2014). The main reason for 
this is that banks have been the primary financial intermediaries 
in the European Union and in the euro area. Most euro area 
member countries’ financial systems are heavily ’bank-centred’ 
and stock and bond markets provide a relatively modest share of 
the financing to the private sector in most countries. Total bank 
assets account for 283% of GDP in the EU, compared to about 
65% of GDP in the US (Fuceri & Zdzienicka, 2013).  
There is no robust evidence in the literature that such a 
financial system, dominated by banks (rather than markets) and 
debt (instead of equity), has increased the capacity of the 
economy for risk-sharing.  
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) and Demyank et al. (2007) find 
evidence that increased cross-banking integration has fostered ex 
post the optimality of the currency union by improving cross-
country risk-sharing. By contrast, Furceri (2013) finds that “the 
decrease in private credit smoothing after the creation of the 
EMU reflects the fact that credit flows have become less counter-
cyclical”.  
By contrast, as is the main focus of this paper, the US shows 
how a high degree of banking integration can absorb shocks. The 
main reason for this is that banking integration in the US has not 
taken the form of cross-border credit, but de facto cross-border 
equity, as a few large banks are operating nationwide.  
 69 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
he existing banking union in the US has been very 
successful in managing local real estate booms and busts. 
A careful comparison of the cases of Nevada and Florida 
(compared to Ireland and Spain, respectively) showed that these 
financial shock absorbers have a higher shock-absorbing 
capacity than could ever be provided by any common budget 
(‘fiscal capacity’) for the euro area. The macroeconomic literature 
confirms this in the sense that it shows that in the US, the shock 
absorption provided by financial markets is much larger than 
that provided by the fiscal system (see, for instance, Begg, 2014).  
There are several channels through which regional 
financial shocks are absorbed at the federal level in the US. The 
FDIC is the most visible one, but the system of securitisation of 
mortgages, especially the ‘GSEs’, contributes as well. Moreover, 
the large banks, which operate nationwide, dominate the 
banking sector. They are able to absorb local losses in their 
overall results. By contrast, in Europe large banks operating in 
different member countries are still perceived as foreign banks 
outside their home country. Integration via international groups 
has so far been limited in the euro area (but has been, as shown 
above as a quasi-banking union, very important for the new 
member states).  
The prevalent form of financial market integration across 
borders within the euro area is debt, which does not act as a 
shock absorber in the case of systemic shocks. By contrast there 
has been much more cross-border equity outside the euro area 
through large-scale foreign ownership of banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
If the really important and costly shocks are national 
financial boom-bust cycles, followed by a financial crisis, the 
T
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question arises: What arrangement provides the best protection 
against these shocks? 
The US experience seems to provide a clear answer: the 
shock-absorbing power of explicit federal transfers to specific 
federal states is rather small, but the US banking union provides 
important support in the case of large shocks to the local financial 
system. 
This has one simple implication: to insure its stability, the 
euro area needs a strong banking union, but not a fiscal union.33 
The usual argument that the former needs to be followed by the 
latter should thus be turned on its head: an area with a well-
functioning banking union has much less need for fiscal shock 
absorbers and does not need a fiscal union (see also Belke, 2013, 
2013a). From the latter, it follows that there is also no need for a 
political union. 
It is of course possible, indeed likely, that the limited 
funding available for the euro area bank resolution fund (the 
SRF) might prove insufficient in the event that a large member 
country experiences a deep crisis. In this case the SRF might need 
a fiscal backstop, much as the FDIC needed a line of credit from 
the US Treasury when its losses exceeded, temporarily, its 
financial base. Such a backstop could be provided by the ESM, 
but it does not seem appropriate to create a fiscal union just to be 
double sure that there is enough common funding for a once in 
a generation crisis.  
This study has concentrated on shocks resulting from 
regional boom-bust cycles. There are of course other sources of 
shocks. The case of Greece has illustrated what can go wrong if a 
government overspends and accumulates excessive debt. Gros 
(2015) argues that even in this case a banking union can help to 
moderate the shock to the financial system. He shows that the 
default of Puerto Rico (practically a fully-fledged state of the US) 
                                                   
33 For an early discussion of fiscal and political union, see Gros & Thygesen 
(1995). The view that a fiscal and political union is needed is expressed at 
the political level by the report of the four EU Presidents on Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union (Van Rompuy et al., 2012). 
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occurred without major financial market disruption in Puerto 
Rico itself because of the fact that the banking system there was 
safeguarded by the US FDIC. 
In a banking union, excessive spending by individual 
member states should ideally lead to difficulties for the state 
concerned, but it should no longer destabilise the entire system. 
This implies that political responsibility for fiscal policy can 
remain at the national level. Technically speaking, one can thus 
argue that a banking union significantly reduces the negative 
external effects of excessive deficits and debts. The EU banking 
union thus represents a key element in making the original 
Maastricht view, with its ‘no bail out clause’, viable in reality. 
Two elements of the US banking union that do not exist, at 
least not yet, in the euro area are widespread securitisation and 
the existence of large banks that operate throughout the entire 
area. These two characteristics of the US financial system present 
important additional shock absorbers and lessen the need for 
fiscal backstops  for the federal institutions. 
But these two characteristics also have their own 
drawbacks. Large banks are often more prone to generate 
systemic risk, and it has been shown (ASC, 2014) that most of the 
growth in the banking sector over the last decade has come from 
the largest banks. The drawbacks of widespread securitisation 
also became apparent during the ‘sub-prime’ crisis, when it was 
shown that the originating banks were subject to serious conflicts 
of interest as they earned fees from originating mortgages 
irrespective of the quality of the borrower and his/her ability to 
service the loans. A system that deals more easily with regional 
crises might thus have other drawbacks.  
The challenge for Europe will be to build a system that 
breaks the ‘diabolical’ feedback loop between weak banks and 
their sovereign but also one that is not dominated by a handful 
of very big banks which are not only too big to fail, but also too 
big to be saved. 
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